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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JTFJ! CHIROPRACTIC ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
and DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 15345 
DESERST MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION 
NATURE OF CASE 
The action in the district court was an appeal of 
certain findings and orders of the Commissioner of Insurance 
pursuant to section 31-4-10 of the Utah Code. The respondent 
~es not believe that the issues confronting this Court present 
questions of first impression. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
by the Honorable Dean E. Conder, dismissed the action as against 
Deseret Mutual Benefit Association on the basis that the appeal 
was not taken within the one-month period provided for such an 
appeal in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 124-125). 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the district court should be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent must take exception to many of the 
statements made in the appellant's lengthy, and at points 
immaterial, statement of facts. The following exceptions 
are noted: 
1. Discrimination against chiropractors by oo~ 
was not established at the December 21, 1976, hearing a~ 
there was no lack of due process. The Commissioner of In· 
surance held that the schedule of benefits under the employ,; 
benefit program of the respondent was not discriminatory 
against chiropractors. (R. 32-39) . 
The schedule of benefits in question was organized 
to pay claims at three different levels. Type 1 benefits wen 
paid at the rate of 100 percent of the usual, reasonable anc 
customary charges. Type 2 benefits were paid at 80 percent 
of the usual, reasonable and customary charges. Finally' 
type 3 benefits, which include maternity expenses, consultat;: 
for emotional illness, and vertebral column rehabilitation, 
were paid at 50 percent of the usual, reasonable and customar 
charges. (R. 96-97). 
The charge made was that the respondent discrimina:' 
t for ver'.'· 
against the chiropractors by paying only 50 percen 
-2-
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,oiwnn rehabilitation (R. 32). 
In the hearing before the Commissioner of Insurance 
Jn oecember 2 2, 19 7 6, the appellant was represented by both 
oaniel L. Berman and Gordon Strachan of Berman and Giauque. 
i·litnesses were called and sworn and testimony was given before 
the commissioner who was represented by Mr. William G. Gibbs, 
special assistant attorney general. Further additional material 
was submitted to the Commissioner. Based thereupon, the Comm-
issioner made his "Findings and Order" dated April 25, 1977. 
(R. 32-33) • A transcript of the proceedings was prepared by 
Barbara G. Anderson, CSR ( R. 52) . 
After a careful consideration of Utah's Insurance 
Equality Law, section 31-27-4 of the Utah Code, the Commissioner 
concluded that the legislature intended to assure equal treat-
ment of practitioners who provide similar services (paragraph 
5, R. 34-35); that vertebral column rehabilitation may be per-
formed by a physician, a therapist or a chiropractor and that 
neither the DMBA insurance policy or practice discriminates 
against chiropractors in the payment for providing these 
services (paragraph 5, R. 34-35); that a policy holder's free-
dom of choice in the selection of a practitioner as contemp-
lated by the Insurance Equality Law is not violated by a 
policy that limits the number of treatments or dollar amounts 
covered of some treatments and not others (paragraph 8, R. 
37
-38); and that there is value in allowing an insurance 
company to write insurance with limited coverage for both 
-3-
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illness and treatment because by expanding coverage be~~ 
intention of the writer of the policy, the premium must c· 
accordingly (paragraph 8, R. 37-38). 
2. Appellant distorts a statement concerning t. 
accuracy of cost justifications (11.ppellant' s Brief, P. J:. 
The statement in full is that " [ t) he above cost estimates, 
quite accurate in some cases and little rnore that guesses 
other areas where data is unavailable ." (R. 75). 
3. The appellant s"':ates that the notice of the 
Commissioner's decision was mailed to the counsel for the 
appellant, citing the record at page 111 (Appellant's Brie' 
P. 4) . Page 111 is a portion of the appellant's memoranc::: 
submitted to the district court on the same subject which 
makes the same statement but without any authority. There 
nothing in the record to support such a contention. Howe':; 
it is clear from the Findings and Order of the Comrnissiw: 
of Insurance that the office of Berman & Giauque received' 
copy of the Findings and Order,dated April 25, 1977, on Apr 
26, 1977, because an office stamp on the first page contair.: 
the following: 
(R. 32). 
RECEIVED 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
4-26-77 
4. The respondent denies that there is "overwhe~·-
. . . . t oractices" 
evidence in the hearing record of d1scr1m1na ory , 
-4-
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---
ht the respondent failed to justify its practices at the t. a 
hearing· 
5. The respondent has no knowledge concerning the 
dealings the appellant had with the Commissioner of Insurance 
as alleged on page 2 of its brief wherein it alleges inaction 
on the part of the Commissioner of Insurance concerning cer-
tain unspecified requests and meetings. 
6. The respondent denies that the appellant filed 
a statement of particulars in the court below, as required 
by law. 
7. The appellant distorts the import of the notice 
of jurisdictional deficiency filed with the district court by 
Mr. William G. Gibbs, special assistant attorney general and 
counsel for the State Insurance Department (R. 54-55). This 
notice is in the nature of advice from a friend of the court 
concerning possible problems with the timing of the appeal of 
the Commissioner's decision. It notifies the court. that "there 
is a question whether it has jurisdiction over the appeal." 
It does not, as alleged, urge dismissal. There is nothing in 
the record that supports the contention that the Commissioner 
was "[c] oncerned by the prospect of having his findings and 
orjers reviewed by the District Court. "(Appellant's Brief, 
p' 5) ' The question raised by the Commissioner is by no 
means a "novel argument" as alleged (Appellant's Brief, P. 5), 
but is based upon the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case 
law. Further, it is untrue that DMBA and Equitable joined in 
-5-
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the Commissioner's 
"motion" because the Commissioner n 
eve: 
made a motion before the court and DMBA and Equitable 
were 
acting independently. 
ARGUMENT 
The question for review presented to this Court:: 
neither novel nor unusual. It is whether the appeals pro-
visions of the Insurance Code are in ccnflict with or incon· 
sis tent with the rules concerning the time for taking an ap;' 
as found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The respondent presents the following points to 
support the district court's determination: 
I. The Appeals Procedure Found in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Apoly to the 
Practice and Procedure in Appealing fror:. 
any Order, Ruling or other Action of any 
Administrative Body to the Extent that 
the Statutory Procedure in Connection w1t'. 
Such an Appeal or Review Is Not in ConfE:· 
and Is Not Inconsistent with the Ut~ 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 81 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure u:.:: 
a heading entitled "General Provisions" states: 
On Appeal from or Review of a Ruling or 
an Order of an Administrative Board or Agency. 
These rules shall apply to the practice and 
procedure in appealing from or obtaining.a 
review of any order, ruling or other action 
of an administrative board or agency, except 
insofar as the specific statutory procedure 
in connection with any such appeal or review 
is in conflict er inconsistent with these 
rules. 
Therefore, based upon Rule 81 (d) , part IX of ~:le 
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Rules entitled "Appeals", encompassing Rules 72-76, ought to 
apply unless there are provisions to the contrary on inconsis-
cent with these rules. 
A case in support of this proposition is National 
.~dvertising Co. v. Utah State Road Cornrn'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 
486 P.2d 383 (1971). In that case, the claim was made that 
the appellant filed his appeal from a decision of the Utah 
state Road Cornrniss ion in an untimely manner. The appellant 
argued that the Road Commission's own rules could not deter-
mine the length of time within which an appeal must be taken 
to the district court. This Court agreed with this proposition, 
but stated that it was not important because the same time 
period was provided in the Utah Rules of Civ~l Procedure which 
"'ere applicable to the review of the decision of the Utah State 
Road Commission. See footnote 2 on page 384 wherein the Court 
recognized that Rule 81 applies to the appeal time on the 
review of decisions of administrative agencies. 
Hence, there is nothing new in Utah law concerning 
the applicability of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the 
time for taking an appeal of the decisions of administrative 
agencies. 
II. The Insurance Code,Containing No 
Provision Concerning the Time for 
Taking an Appeal to the District 
Court, Is Not in Conflict with and 
Is Not Inconsistent with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which Pre-
scribe a One-Month Appeals Period 
There is no question, as the appellant asserts, that 
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the Insurance Code has certain provisions dealing 'th 
w1 appe' 
from a decision of the Commissioner of Insurance. However, 
the crucial fact is this: There is no provision int~~ 
-
surance Code that prescribes the time period within which a: 
appeal must be taken to the Third Judicial District court c'. 
-Salt Lake County . 
The appellant misses the point when it attempts t 
point out the differences between the appeals procedures fu: 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and those found in the 
Ir.surance Code. It is true that r.ot all of the appeals pro· 
cedures are identical. However, concerning the only procea;;, 
issue facing the Court now--the timing of the appeal--there 
is no conflict or inconsistency, because the Insurance~& 
simply has no provision whatsoever concerning the time for 
taking an appeal. 
It is immaterial that the appeals procedures pro· 
vided in the Utah Code for other administrative bodies may t 
"more amenable" to the appeals provisions of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The point is that the time for taking r 
appeal from any decision of any administrative agency is go':· 
erned by the appeals procedures of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless there is a conflicting appeals period founc 
elsewhere in the Utah Code. 
There is no question that the proceeding in the 
Third District court of Salt Lake County is an appeal. sec· 
tion 31-4-9 of the Utah Code provides that an aggrieved par:: 
-8-
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"~peal from the commissioner's order . . . 
in:iY • An appeal 
may be taken only to the district court of Salt Lake county 
... 
(Emphasis added) . Section 31-4-10 of th~ Utah 
code is entitled "Manner of taking appeal." (Emphasis Added). 
Further references throughout the next preceding sections 
clearly indicate that the nature of the proceeding is an 
"appeal". 
Moreover, it is stated that: 
The court shall hear the appeal upon the 
transcript of the record of the commission's 
hearing and on such additional proper evidence 
as may be offered by any party. After con-
sidering the evidence the court may affirm, 
modify, or set aside the order appealed from. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-4-12 ( 197 4) • 
The appeal is taken by filing with the clerk a pet-
ition for a review (similar to a notice of appeal) and a 
statement of particulars in which is claimed that the order 
is in error (similar to a statement of points which must be 
served, if required, within 10 days after the filing of the 
notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 73 (d)) and a statement of 
relief prayed for. 
In summary, the Utah Chiropractic Association, Inc. 
i!ttempted to take an appeal from the Findings and Order of 
the Commissioner of Insurance. The appeals procedure contained 
in the Insurance Code does not specify a time period within 
which the appeal must be taken. Therefore, there is nothing 
inconsistent with the procedures regarding the time for taking 
an appeal as found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which, 
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according to Rule 81, must be applied. 
III. The Appellant Did Not Take a 
Timely Appeal from the Findings 
and Order of the Commissioner of 
Insurance whether the Provisions 
of Rule 73(a)-(g) Are Applied or 
whether the Provisions of Rule 
73(h)-(m) Are Applied 
The appellant attempts to argue that the appeal fr 
the decision of the Commissioner of Insurance is more anall:. 
to an appeal from a judgment rendered in a city or justice 
court than to an appeal from the judgment of a district cou;· 
Under the facts of this case, the respondent contends ili~ .. 
is immaterial which of the two appeals procedures found in 
Rule 7 3 is applied. However, if a choice had to be made be: .. 
the two, it would appear that the provisions contained in Ru: 
73 (a) - (g) should apply to this case for the following reasc: 
1. The Commissioner of Insurance conducted an ex-
tensive hearing into a matter that is peculiarly within his 
field of expertise and responsibility. 
2. The appeal at the district court level would cE 
primarily a review of the record made by the Commissioner of 
Insurance during the December 22, 1976 hearing. Althoughb 
legislature used the term "de novo" in describing the appea:: 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-4-9 (1974), specific language in a sub-
sequent section provides (a) that the court shall hear t~ 
appeal upon the transcript of the record of the commissione!': 
be offe: hearing and on such additional pror:er evidence as may 
-10-
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by the parties and (b) that the reviewing court has au th-
ority to affirm, modify, or set aside the order appealed 
::·om. Utah Code Ann. § 31-4-12 (1974). Such a procedure 
15 similar to the procedure followed by the Utah Supreme 
court in a review of a judgment of the district court with 
the exception that additional testimony is not taken. 
3. In this case, it is not likely that there will 
be much, if any, additional testimony presented to the dis-
trict court beyond what is contained in the 129-page trans-
cript from the Commissioner of Insurance. The appellant's 
"Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Orders of 
Commissioner of Insurance" (R. 2-24), submitted to the district 
c:iurt concurrently with its petition for review, (a) bears a 
striking resemblance to an appellant's brief and (b) is based 
upon the record established at the hearing before the 
Commissioner of Insurance. 
4. The procedure relating to an appeal from a city 
or justice court provides that: 
All causes appealed to the district court 
shall be heard anew. Pleadings may be amended 
in all respects in the same manner and upon the 
same terms as pleadings in cases originally 
commenced therein . 
Rule 73 (m), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal is not 
a matter of review, but a matter of starting afresh with new 
pleadings, discovery and trial. Such is not contemplated 
by the apreal s i:- procedure found in the Insurance Code. 
The function of the district court in this case would 
-11-
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have been very similar to the function of the Utah s 
up re~., 
Court in handling an appeal and quite dissimilar to the 
function of the district court in a de ~ trial origin-
ated in a city or justice court. 
The Court can avoid the issue of which appeals ... 
,. 
visions to apply because under either set of rules, the 
appellant failed to file his appeal in a timely fashi~. 
Rule 73 (a) - (g). Under the primary procedure, the 
time within which an appeal is to be taken is specified as 
one month from the date of the entry of the judgment or 
order appealed fron. Rule 73 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The Findings a:id Order were signed by the Cammi-
ssioner on April 25, 1977, which act is synonymous with tje 
entry of a judgment in the district court. Therefore, the 
last day that an appeal could have been filed was May 25, 
1977. See In re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d454 
(1953) for the formula used to calculate the concluding day 
of the one-month period. Because the petition was not filei 
until May 27, 1977, it was not filed in a timely manner. 
Rule 73 (h) - (m). If the other appeals provisions;: 
applied, the same results follow. The appellant claimed tr.:: 
a notice of the decision was mailed to the appellant. IAW 
ellant' s Brief, P. 17) . For support for this statement re:-
erence is made by the appellant to page 111 of the record. 
Page 111 of the record is simply page 2 of a memorandum r;~:: 
by the appellant in the district court to support the same 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. · rt is there stated that "[c]o,..,bs [sic] were ?05 1t1on. I:""" 
mailed to counsel for petitioner." Nothing further is cited 
for the proposition in the memorandum to the district court. 
:ioreovsr, there is nothing in the record before this court 
w indicate that a notice of the Findings and Order was mailed 
to the appellant's attorneys. It is clear, however, that the 
office of Berman & Giauque actually received a copy of the 
Findings and Order on April 26, 1977, thereby giving notice 
of the adverse decision (R. 32). Rule 73 (h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be taken to the 
filstrict court from the final judgment of a city or justice 
court within one month after notice of the entry of such 
judgment. Because notice was received by the appellant on 
Aprii 26, 1977, the one-month period expired on May 26, 1977. 
Hence, under either set of procedures, the petition, which 
was not filed until May 27, 1977, was not timely filed. 
The case of Glad v. Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah 1977), 
is not applicable because it deals with the computation of 
time when the last day of the one-month appeal period falls 
on a Sunday. In this case, both May 25 and 26, 1977 are 
weekdays that are not legal holidays. Hence, no extra days 
beyond the one-month appeal period would be allowed under 
~le 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
IV. A Court of Review Has No Jurisdiction 
to Entertain an Appeal When the Request 
for an Appeal Is Not Timely 
I! 1 1T\any instances, the failure of a party to follow 
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strictly the requirements of the appeals rules doesnot o:: 
the validity of the appeal. However, the rules and case; 
explicit that the failure to timely file a notice of apps: 
is jurisdictional in the sense that the revie\·1ing court~: 
not consider the matter any further and that such an ap;,, 
can be and should be dismissed, even if no motion to tha' 
effect has been made by a party. 
This is alluded to in Rule 73 (a) (first puagrac' 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein the one-mont'. 
requirement for notice of appeal is stated. In the third 
paragraph it is stated: 
Failure of the appellant to take any of the 
further steps to secure the review of the 
judgment appealed from does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only 
for such remedies as are specified in this 
rule or, when no remedy is. specified, for 
such action as the Supreme Court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of 
the appeal. 
(Emphasis added) . The clear implication from this statemer: 
is that the failure of the appellant to take any of the prs· 
ceding steps to secure review of the judgment (such as t1~e. 
filing in the first paragraph) does affect the validity of 
the appeal. 
The cases are clear on this point. For example, 
in Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (19 55 ' 
the Court stated: 
The purpose of this Rule to make juris-
dictional a failure to file the notice of 
appeal on time is clearly evident by the 
-14-
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special provision therein that: 
"Failure of the appellant to take 
anv of the further steps to secure the 
review of the judgment appealed from 
does not affect the validity of the 
appeal, but is ground only for such 
remedies as are specified .... " 
(Italics supplied [by Anderson court].) 
282 P.2d at 847. 
In that case, the Court dismissed the appeal where 
the notice had been filed on March 24, 1954, which was more 
than a month after the trial court, on February 23, 1954, had 
denied the petition to vacate its order. 
To the same affect is In re Estate of Ratliff, 19 
Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), wherein this Court stated: 
Since the notice was filed more than one 
month after the entry of judgment or the 
order appealed from (Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.), 
this court 1acks jurisdiction to entertain 
the appeal, and is therefore compelled to 
order a dismissal thereof. 
431 P.2d at 573-74. 
It i.s not possible to "smooth the edges" of this 
rule. For example, in In re Lynch's Estate,123 Utah 57, 254 
P.2d 454 (1953), the trial court denied the motion to amend 
or to grant a new trial on November 22, 1952. The notice of 
appeal was filed on December 23, 1952, the day after an appeal 
would l1ave been timely filed. Despite the closeness of the 
filir.g, this Court held that the appeal could not be enter-
tained. 
The law that the filing of the notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional continues the law and practice existing before 
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the enactment of the present rules. For example, in ~ 
Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P. 228 (1914), this Court 
stated tho 
the filing of a notice of appeal was jurisdictional in t~ 
sense that it 11 affects the power of this court to hear and 
determine the appeal . II 143 P. at 229. To the same 
effect is Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439 
(1939). 
The prevailing party has never been required to, 
prejudice to support the dismissal of an untir.lely appeal. '. 
rule is absolute in nature when an untimely appeal is attem: 
from a final order or judgment. 
The case of Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P ..
634 (1966), is not to the contrary. In Wood, this Court he:. 
that the premature filing of a notice of appeal from the de;. 
of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, made within one mo:.: 
after the district court had stated that the petition was co 
ied but before the signing and filing of a formal judgment, 
not a defect which would necessarily deprive the appellate 
court of jurisdiction but was an irregularity which could be 
the grounds for dismissal of an appeal within the discretior. 
of the court. Two sentences from that opinion, however,~ 
dicate that the case has no application here: 
It is true that this court has pre-
viously held that the filing of a notice 
of appeal after the expiration of the one 
month allowed by the rule is a jurisdic-
tional defect. Our conclusion in this 
case represents no departure from that 
holding. 
419 P.2d at 635. 
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The case of National Advertising Co. v. Utah State 
~ad commission , 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971), does 
net alter the rule that the late filing of an appeal is a 
jurisdictional defect. National Advertising dealt with an 
appeal from the State Road Commission, which appeal was not 
taken until several months after the plaintiff received a 
notice of the Commission's decision. The district court 
accepted review of the Commission's action and the Utah Sup-
reme court held that the trial court was within its preroga-
tive in doing so. 
However, it appears that the decision appealed from 
was not final until several months after the written decision 
was handed down : 
But it is also true that the plaintiff sought 
modification and change in the order and that 
there continued to be negotiations and corres-
pondence between the parties concerning the 
carrying out of the requirement imposed by the 
Road Commission until what appears to be a 
definite and final refusal of the Commission to 
change its order on July 11, 1969. The court 
proceeding was initiated within the 30 days 
thereafter on July 22. 
486 P. 2d at 384. Footnore 3 on page 384 of the same decision 
further amplifies the interlocutory nature of the written 
decision: 
The detail of the events would unduly 
and unnecessarily extend the opinion, 
but they include the fact that under 
plaintiff's claims it promptly (within 
four days after receiving notice) req-
uested by letter of April 3, 1969, an 
extension of time to appeal; and that 
by a letter of April 8 the Commission 
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granted S'Jch extension, also referring 
to what should be done about the sign; 
and that there continued to be negotia-
tions from which the plaintiff could 
reasonably believe the matter was not 
closed until the final action of the 
committee on July 11. 
In the case at bar, it is clear that the Findings 
and Order of the Commissioner of Insurance were final. The 
appellant does not contend that any further negotiations 
or discussions were conducted between the Commissioner of 
Insurance and the appellant. Hence, the Findings and Order 
being final, the starting of the appeal time would not have 
been extended as in National Advertising. 
V. There Is No Reason to Apply Estab-
lished Jurisdictional Requirements 
Prospectively Only. 
The appellant would have this Court apply the jurL· 
dictional requirements of the timely filing of an appeal of a 
decision of an administrative body prospectively only, despi:: 
the provisions of Rule 81 (d) and the case of National Adverti' 
Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 
383 (1971), which announced six years ago that Rule 81 makes 
the appeals provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
applicable to appeals from administrative bodies, unless 
contrary to statute. This Court is not being asked to de-
clare any statute or long-established principle invalid; 
instead, it is being asked to affirm a judgment based upon 
established procedural law. Justice does not require that 
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'.'ese established jurisdictional requirements be applied 
prospectively only· 
CONCLUSION 
The Commissioner of Insurance absolved the respondent 
from the charges of the appellant that it was discriminating 
against chiropractors. The Commissioner held a lengthy hearing 
during which able counsel for the ai;:ipellant presented their 
case against the respondent. The Commissioner ruled, in 
essence, that the respondent did not discriminate against chiro-
practors by the terms of its policy and procedures. The 
appellant did receive a fair and impartial hearing of its 
complaint. 
Although the appellant desired to appeal the Comm-
1ssioner' s ruling, it did not do so in a timely fashion. Such 
a failure is jurisdictional and absolute. The appellant is 
not saved by resort to the appeals procedures applied to appeals 
from a city or justice court because the record clearly in-
dicates that the appellant had notice of the decision of the 
Commissioner more than one month before it attempted to take 
its appeal. There is nothing contained in the appeals pro-
'1isions of the Insurance Code that is inconsistent or con-
flicting with the provisions concerning the time for taking 
an appeal from a decision of an administrative body as found 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The appellant did not take his appeal (May 27, 1977) 
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within one month from the entry of the order appealed fr~ 
(April 25, 1977) or within one month from notice of the ad-
verse decision (April 26, 1977). Therefore, the district 
court had no authority to entertain further proceedings on 
the appeal, and the appeal was property dismissed. 
DATED this day of November, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYL: 
By~O.W@ 
David A. Westerby 
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